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Abstract. The block cipher KASUMI, proposed by ETSI SAGE more than 10 years ago, is widely
used for security in many synchronous wireless standards nowadays. For instance, the confidentiality
and integrity of 3G mobile communications systems depend on the security of KASUMI. Up to
now, there are a great deal of cryptanalytic results on KASUMI, however, its security evaluation
against the recent zero-correlation linear attacks is still lacking. In this paper, combining with some
observations on the FL, FO and FI functions, we select some special input/output masks to refine
the general 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations and propose the 6-round zero-correlation
linear attack on KASUMI. Moreover, under the weak keys conditions that the second keys of the FL
function in round 2 and round 8 have the same value at 1st to 8th and 11th to 16th bit-positions,
we expand the attack to 7-round KASUMI(2-8). These weak keys take 1/214 of the key space.
The new zero-correlation linear attack on the 6-round needs about 285 encryptions with 262.8
known plaintexts and 254 memory bytes. For the attack under weak keys conditions on the last
7 round, the data complexity is about 262.1 known plaintexts, the time complexity is about 2110.5
encryptions and the memory requirements are about 285 bytes.
Keywords: KASUMI, Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, Cryptography.
1 Introduction
With the rapid growth of wireless services, various security algorithms have been developed
to provide users with effective and secure communications. The block cipher KASUMI,
developed from a previous block cipher known as MISTY1[11], was chosen as the foundation
for the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithm[15] and was also recommended as the
standard algorithms A5/3 and GEA3 in GSM and GPRS mobile communications systems[16].
For this reason, it is very important to understand the security offered by KASUMI.
Up to now, a great deal of attention have been paid to KASUMI and many cryptanalytic
methods have been used to evaluate its security. In the single-key setting, Sugio et al.[12][14]
gave the Integral-interpolation attack and higher order differential attack on 6/5-round KA-
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2Attack Type Rounds Date Time Memory Source
Higher-Order Differential 5 222.1CP 260.7Enc −− [14]
Higher-Order Differential 5 228.9CP 231.2Enc −− [13]
Integral-Interpolation 6 248CP 2126.2Enc −− [12]
Impossible Differential 6 255CP 2100Enc −− [10]
Multidimensional Zero-Correlation 6 262.8KP 285Enc 254 bytes Sect.[4]
Impossible Differential 7(2-8) 252.5CP 2114.3Enc −− [9]
Impossible Differential 7(1-7) 262KP 2115.8Enc 284.4 bytes [9]
Multidimensional Zero-Correlation(WK) 7(2-8) 262.1KP 2110.5Enc 285 bytes Sect.[5]
CP,KP refer to the number of chosen plaintexts and known plaintexts.
Enc refers to the number of encryptions. −− means not given.
WK refers to the second keys of the FL function in round 2 and 8 have the same value at 1-8 and 11-16 bit-positions.
Table 1: Summary of the attacks on KASUMI
SUMI and later, they [13] improved the higher order differential attack on 5-round KASUMI
to practical complexity. Ku¨hn [10] introduced the impossible differential attack on 6-round
KASUMI. At SAC 2012, Jia et al [9] refined the impossible differential by selecting some spe-
cial input differential values and extended the 12-years old impossible differential attack on
6-round KASUMI to 7-round. In the related-key setting, Blunden et al.[6] gave a related-key
differential attack on 6-round KASUMI. Using related-key booming and rectangle attack, Bi-
ham et al. [5] proposed the first related-key attack on the full 8-round KASUMI. At Crypto
2010, sandwich attacks [7], which belongs to a formal extension of booming attacks, was
introduced to the full KASUMI. As the key schedule of KASUMI is linear and simple, attack
effects in the related-key setting are much better. However, these attacks assume control over
the differences of two or more related keys, which renders the resulting attack inapplicable
in most real world usage scenarios. In this paper, we apply the recent zero-correlation linear
attacks to the block cipher KASUMI. Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, proposed by Bog-
danov and Rijmen[1], is a novel promising attack technique for block ciphers. It uses the linear
approximation with correlation zero generally existing in block ciphers to distinguish between
a random permutation and a block cipher. The initial distinguishers [1] had some limitations
in terms of data complexity, which needs at least half of the codebook. In FSE 2012, Bog-
danov and Wang [2] proposed a more data-efficient distinguisher by making use of multiple
linear approximations with correlation zero. The date complexity is reduced, however, the
distinguishers rely on the assumption that all linear approximations with correlation zero are
independent. To remove the unnecessary independency assumptions on the distinguishing
side, multidimensional distinguishers [3] had been constructed for the zero-correlation prop-
erty at AsiaCrypt 2012. Recently, the multidimensional zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
has been using in the analysis of the block cipher CAST-256[3], CLEFIA[4], HIGHT[17] and
E2[18] successfully.
In this paper, we evaluate the security of KASUMI with respect to the multidimensional
3zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. The general 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations: (β, 0)
5-round−→ (β, 0), that
holds for any balanced Feistel scheme(the round function is bijective), can be used in the
analysis of KASUMI, where β is any non-zero 32-bit value. However, if we take all non-zero
values for β, there will be two many guessed subkey bits involved in the key recovery process
that the time complexity will be greater than exhaustive search. In order to reduce the num-
ber of guessed subkey bits, we only use some special zero-correlation linear approximations.
We first investigate the properties of the linear masks propagate in components (AND, OR
functions)and then show some observations on the FL,FO and FI function. Based on those
observations, we give some conditions the special linear approximations should satisfy.
2. We propose the multidimensional zero-correlation linear attack on 6-round KASUMI.
Up to now, there are no linear attacks on KASUMI and we bridge this gap, if we treat the
zero-correlation linear attack as a special case of linear attacks.
3. We assume that the second keys of the FL function in round 2 and round 8 have
the same values at 1st to 8th and 11th to 16th bit-positions and then under this weak key
conditions, we expand the attack to 7 rounds(2-8).
The paper is organized as follows: we list some notations, give a brief description of the
block cipher KASUMI and outline the ideas of the multidimensional zero-correlation linear
cryptanalysis in Section 2. Some observations on AND, OR, FL FO and FI functions are
shown in Section 3. Section 4 and Section 5 illustrate our attacks on 6-round and 7-round
KASUMI. We conclude this paper in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
FLi : the i-th FL function of KASUMI with subkey KLi.
FOi : the i-th FO function of KASUMI with subkey (KOi,KIi).
FIij : the j-th FI function of FOi with subkey KIij .
x≫ i : x rotates left by i bits.
x≪ i : x rotates right by i bits.
∧ : bitwise AND.
∨ : bitwise OR.
⊕ : bitwise XOR.
¬ : bitwise NOT.
a · b : the scalar product of binary vectors by a · b = ⊕n−1i=0 aibi.
ab : the bitwise point multiplication of binary vectors by ab = (a0b0, a1b1, ..., an−1bn−1).
X‖Y : the concatenation of X and Y .
z[i] : the i-th bit of z, and ′0′ is the most significant bit.
z[i1 − i2] : the (i2 − i1 + 1) bits from the i1-th bit to i2-th bit of z.
4Figure 1: The structure and building blocks of KASUMI
2.2 Description of KASUMI
The KASUMI algorithms [15] are symmetric block ciphers with a block size of 64 bits and a
key size of 128 bits. We give a brief description of KASUMI in this section.
KASUMI is a Feistel structure with 8 rounds, see Fig. 1 (a) for an illustration. The round
function consists of an FL function and an FO function. The FL function is a simple key-
dependent boolean function, depicted in Fig. 1 (d). Let the inputs of the FL function of the
i-th round be XLi = XLi,l‖XLi,r,KLi = (KLi,1,KLi,2), the output be Y Li = Y Li,l‖Y Li,r,
where XLi,l,XLi,r,Y Li,l and Y Li,r are 16-bit integers. We define the FL function as follows:
Y Li,r = ((XLi,l ∧KLi,1)≪ 1)⊕XLi,r;
Y Li,l = ((Y Li,r ∨KLi,2)≪ 1)⊕XLi,l,
5Algorithm 1 The KASUMI block cipher
Require: 64-bit plaintext P = (L0, R0); main key K,
Ensure: 64-bit ciphertext C = (L8, R8).
1: Derive round keys KOi, KIi and KLi (1 ≤ i ≤ 8) from K.
2: for j = 1 to 8 do
3: if j is odd, do
4: Lj = FO(FL(Lj−1,KLj),KOj ,KIj)⊕Rj−1, Rj = Lj−1,
5: else, do :
6: Lj = FL(FO(Lj−1,KOj ,KIj),KLj)⊕Rj−1, Rj = Lj−1.
7: end for
8: return C = (L8, R8).
The FO function, depicted in Fig. 1 (b), is another three-round Feistel structure con-
sisting of three FI functions and key mixing stages. Let XOi = XOi,l‖XOi,r, KOi =
(KOi,1,KOi,2,KOi,3), KIi = (KIi,1,KIi,2,KIi,3) be the inputs of the FO function of i-th
round, and Y Oi = Y Oi,l‖Y Oi,r be the corresponding output, where XOi,l,XOi,r,Y Oi,l,Y Oi,r
and XIi,3 are 16-bit integers. Then the FO function has the form
XIi,3 = FI((XOi,l ⊕KOi,1),KIi,1)⊕XOi,r;
Y Oi,l = FI((XOi,r ⊕KOi,2),KIi,2)⊕XIi,3;
Y Oi,r = FI((XIi,3 ⊕KOi,3),KIi,3)⊕ Y Oi,l.
The FI function uses two S-boxes S7 and S9 which are permutations of 7-bit to 7-bit and
9-bit to 9-bit respectively. Suppose the inputs of the j-th FI function of the i-th round are
XIi,j , and the output is Y Ii,j , where XIi,j and Y Ii,j are 16-bit integers. We define half of
FI function as FI, which is a 16-bit to 16-bit permutation. The structure of FI and FI is
depicted in Fig. 1 (c). Y Ii,j = FI(XIi,j) is defined as
Y Ii,j [7− 15] = S9(XIi,j [0− 8])⊕XIi,j [9− 15];
Y Ii,j [0− 6] = S7(XIi,j [9− 15])⊕ Y Ii,j [7− 15],
the FI function is simplified as
Y Ii,j = FI(XIi,j ,KIi,j) = FI((FI(XIi,j)⊕KIi,j)≪ 7).
Let Li||Ri =
(
(Li,l‖Li,r)‖(Ri,l‖Ri,r)
)
be the input of the i-th round, and then the round
function is defined as
Li = FO(FL(Li−1,KLi),KOi,KIi)⊕Ri−1, Ri = Li−1,
where i = 1, 3, 5, 7, and when i = 2, 4, 6, 8,
Li = FL(FO(Li−1,KOi,KIi),KLi)⊕Ri−1, Ri = Li−1.
6Round KLi,1 KLi,2 KOi,1 KOi,2 KOi,3 KIi,1 KIi,2 KIi,3
1 k1 ≪ 1 k′3 k2 ≪ 5 k6 ≪ 8 k7 ≪ 13 k′5 k′4 k′8
2 k2 ≪ 1 k′4 k3 ≪ 5 k7 ≪ 8 k8 ≪ 13 k′6 k′5 k′1
3 k3 ≪ 1 k′5 k4 ≪ 5 k8 ≪ 8 k1 ≪ 13 k′7 k′6 k′2
4 k4 ≪ 1 k′6 k5 ≪ 5 k1 ≪ 8 k2 ≪ 13 k′8 k′7 k′3
5 k5 ≪ 1 k′7 k6 ≪ 5 k2 ≪ 8 k3 ≪ 13 k′1 k′8 k′4
6 k6 ≪ 1 k′8 k7 ≪ 5 k3 ≪ 8 k4 ≪ 13 k′2 k′1 k′5
7 k7 ≪ 1 k′1 k8 ≪ 5 k4 ≪ 8 k5 ≪ 13 k′3 k′2 k′6
8 k8 ≪ 1 k′2 k1 ≪ 5 k5 ≪ 8 k6 ≪ 13 k′4 k′3 k′7
x≪ i: x rotates left by i bits. k′i = ki ⊕ ci, where the cis are fixed constants.
Table 2: The key schedule of KASUMI
Here, (L0, R0), (L8, R8) are the plaintext and ciphertext respectively, and Li−1, Ri−1 denote
the left and right 32-bit halves of the i-th round input. The KASUMI cipher can be described
in Algorithm 1.
The key schedule of KASUMI is much simpler than the original key schedule of MISTY1.
The 128-bit keyK is divided into eight 16-bit words: (k1, k2, ..., k8), i.e., K = (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5,
k6, k7, k8). In each round, eight key words are used to compute the round subkeys, that
is, KLi, KOi and KIi, where KLi = (KLi,1,KLi,2),KOi = (KOi,1,KOi,2,KOi,3) and
KIi = (KIi,1,KIi,2,KIi,3). We summarize the details of the key schedule of KASUMI in
Tab. 2.
2.3 Zero-correlation Linear cryptanalysis
In this section, we briefly recall the basic concepts of multidimensional zero-correlation linear
cryptanalysis. Consider a function f : Fn2 7→ Fm2 and let the input of the function be x ∈ Fn2 .
A linear approximation with an input mask α and an output mask β is the following function:
x 7→ β · f(x)⊕ a · x,
and its correlation is defined as follows
C(β · f(x), a · x) = 2Prx(β · f(x)⊕ a · x = 0)− 1.
In zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, the distinguishers use linear approximations with
zero correlation for all keys while the classical linear cryptanalysis utilizes linear approxi-
mations with correlation far from zero. Bogdanov et al. [3] proposed a multidimensional
zero-correlation linear distinguisher using ` zero-correlation linear approximations and re-
quiring O(2n/
√
`) known plaintexts, where n is the block size of a cipher.
We treat the zero-correlation linear approximations available as a linear space spanned
by m base zero-correlation linear approximations such that all ` = 2m non-zero linear com-
binations of them have zero correlation. For each of the 2m data values z ∈ Fm2 , the attacker
7initializes a counter V [z], z = 0, 1, ..., 2m − 1 to value zero. Then, for each distinct plaintext,
the attacker computes the data value z in Fm2 by evaluating the m basis linear approxima-
tions, that is, z[i] = αi · p ⊕ βi · c , i = 0, ...,m − 1, where we denote the i-th basis linear
approximation and any plaintext-ciphertext pair by (αi, βi) and (p, c). Then, increase the
counter V [z] of this data value by one. Then the attacker computes the statistic T :
T =
2m−1∑
i=0
(V [z]−N2−m)2
N2−m(1− 2−m) . (1)
The statistic T follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ0 = (` − 1)2n−N2n−1 and variance σ20 =
2(` − 1)(2n−N2n−1 )2 for the right key guess, while for the wrong key guess, it follows a X 2-
distribution with mean µ1 = `− 1 and variance σ21 = 2(`− 1).
If we denote the probability of false positives and the probability of false negatives to
distinguish between a wrong key and a right key as β0 and β1, respectively, and we consider
the decision threshold τ = µ0 +σ0z1−β0 = µ1−σ1z1−β1 , then the number of known plaintexts
N should be about
N =
(2n − 1)(z1−β0 + z1−β1)√
(`− 1)/2 + z1−β0
+ 1, (2)
where z1−β0 and z1−β1are the respective quantiles of the standard normal distribution, see
[3] for detail.
2.4 The Partical-Sum technique
The partial-sum technique [8] was first introduced by Ferguson et al. to analyse the block
cipher AES. The partial-sum technique can reduce the complexity by partially computing
the sum by guessing each key one after another. For an example, in the key recovery phase of
the AES, the partial decryption involves 4 bytes of the key and 3 bytes of the ciphertext. We
denoted the byte position i of each ciphertext and corresponding keys by ci, ki and suppose
that 224 ciphertexts to be analyzed, then, the equation can be described as follows:
224⊕
n=1
[
S3
(
S2(c2,n ⊕ k2)⊕ S1(c1,n ⊕ k1)⊕ S0(c0,n ⊕ k0
)⊕ k3)]. (3)
With a straightforward method, the analysis takes 224+32 = 256 partial decryptions, while
the partial-sum technique requires about 241.6 partial decryptions. The idea is partially
computing the sum by guessing each key byte one after another.
1. Guess two key bytes k2 and k1. Allocate a counter N1[x1] for each of 2
16 possible
values of x1 = x
0
1‖x11 and set them zero. For 224 ciphertexts (c0,n, c1,n, c2,n), compute x11 =
S2(c2,n ⊕ k2)⊕ S1(c1,n ⊕ k1) and let x01 = c0,n, calculate the number of ciphertext with given
values x1 and save it in N1[x1].
8Figure 2: Property of AND, OR, FL and FI functions
2. Guess the key byte k0. Allocate a counter N2[x2] for each of 2
8 possible values of x2,
and set them zero. For 28 possible values c0,n, compute x2 = x
1
1 ⊕ S0(c0,n ⊕ k0), and update
the value N2[x2] = N2[x2] +N1[x1].
3. Guess the key byte k3. Allocate a counter N3[x3] for each of 2
8 possible values of x3
and set them zero. For 28 possible values x2, compute x3 = S3(x2 ⊕ k3), and update the
value N3[x3] = N3[x3] +N2[x2].
In the first step, k2 and k1 are guessed, the complexity is 2
16 × 224 = 240. For the second
step, k0 is guessed, the complexity is 2
16 × 28 × 216 = 240. Finally, k3 is guessed and Eq. (3)
is computed. The complexity for the guess of k3 is 2
16 × 28 × 28 × 28 = 240.
3 Some Observations in KASUMI
We describe some observations on AND, OR, FL, FO as well as FI functions, which will be
used in our cryptanalysis of KASUMI.
Observation 1. Let M be a `-bit value and define the OR, AND functions h1, h2 as h1(x) =
M ∨ x, h2(x) = M ∧ x. Then there are two properties of the two functions, such that
(I) For any `-bit masks α and β, C(β · h1(x), α · x) 6= 0 if and only if α =qM  β;
(II) For any `-bit masks α and β, C(β · h2(x), α · x) 6= 0 if and only if α = M  β.
9Proof. We only consider the case of the OR function h1(x). Noticed that the j-th bit of the
output mask β[j] does not affect the i-th bit of the input mask α[i] when i 6= j, then, for any
i ∈ (0, ` − 1), we have that α[i] = β[i], when M [i] = 0, and α[i] = 0, when M [i] = 1, which
can be summarized as α =qM  β. The necessary property can be established clearly. See
Figure 2 (b).
Observation 2. If the output masks of FLi function is (β, β
′), where β′ = (β≫ 1)KLi,2,
that is,
β′[j] =qKLi,2[j]β[j + 1], where j = 0, 2, ...14, and β′[15] =qKLi,2[15]β[0],
then the input masks of FLi function is (β, 0), see Figure 2(c).
Observation 3. If the output masks of FIi,j function is β, where β is a 16-bit value with
β[0−6] = β[9−15] and β[7] = β[8] = 0, then the input masks of FIi,j function α only depend
on 7-bit subkey KIi,j [0− 6], see Figure 2(d).
Base on Observation 2, Observation 3 and the structure of round functiom of the KASUMI
block cipher, we have the following two results.
Observation 4. Let (β, β′) be the output mask of FL6 function, such that β′ = (β ≫
1)qKL6,2, then the input mask of FO6,1 function (α, α′) only depend on the 64-bit subkey
KO6,1, KI6,1, KO6,2, and KI6,2. Moreover, if the equations β[0− 6] = β[9− 15] and β[7] =
β[8] = 0 hold, then (α, α′) only depend on the 46-bit subkey KO6,1, KI6,1[0− 6], KO6,2, and
KI6,2[0− 6].
Observation 5. Let (β, β′) be the output mask of FL2 and FL8 functions, such that β′ =
(β≫ 1)qKL2,2qKL8,2, and for any 0 ≤ i ≤ 15,
(β≫ 1)[i] =

0, if (KL2,2 ⊕KL8,2)[i] = 1;
0 or 1, if (KL2,2 ⊕KL8,2)[i] = 0.
then the output mask of FI2,3 and FI8,3 be zero, and the input masks of FO2, FO8 functions
(a, a′), (γ, γ′) depend on the 96-bit subkeys KO2,1, KI2,1, KO2,2, KI2,2, KO8,1, KI8,1, as
KI8,2,KO8,2 can be deduced from above subkeys. Moreover, if the equations β[0−6] = β[9−15]
and β[7] = β[8] = 0 hold, then (α, α′) only depend on the 78-bit subkeys KO2,1, KI2,1[0− 6],
KO2,2, KI2,2, KO8,1, KI8,1[0− 6].
10
Figure 3: Multidimensional Zero-correlation attack on 6-round KASUMI
4 Key-Recovery Attack on 6-Round KASUMI
The generic 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations of the balanced Feistel structure
was introduced by Bogdanov and Rijmen in [1], which is: (β, 0)
5-Round−→ (β, 0), where β is
a 32-bit non-zero value. Combined with the Feistel structure of the round function, some
special values of input/output masks β are selected to attack the 6-round version of KASUMI.
We mount the 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations from round 1 to round 5, and
extend one round backward. We select the 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations
as:
(β‖β′, 0) 5-Round−→ (β‖β′, 0),
where β′ = (β ≫ 1)qKL6,2 and β is 16-bit non-zero value with β[0 − 6] = β[9 − 15] and
β[7] = β[8] = 0.
The choice is to minimize the key words guessing during the attack on 6-round KASUMI.
Based on observations 3, we know that, if the input mask of the first round is selected as
above, KI6,3, KO6,3 and parts of KI6,1 and KI6,2 are not involved in the computation,
which can help us to reduce the complexity of the attack. The zero-correlation linear attack
on 6-round KASUMI is demonstrated as follows, see also Fig. 3.
In our attack, we guess the subkeys and evaluate the linear approximation (β, β′)T ·((L0,l⊕
L6,l), (L0,r ⊕ L6,r)
)
= 0, that is
(β, β′)·(L0,l⊕L6,l⊕R6,r, L0,r⊕L6,r)⊕β·
(
FI(R6,l⊕(k1 ≪ 5), k′4)⊕FI(R6,r⊕(k5 ≪ 8), k′3)
)
= 0,
11
where β′ = (β ≫ 1)qKL6,2 and β is any 16-bit non-zero value with β[0 − 6] = β[9 − 15]
and β[7] = β[8] = 0. Then the key recovery attack on 6-round KASUMI is proceeded with
Partial-sum technique as follows:
1. Collect N plaintexts with corresponding ciphertexs. Allocate a 16-bit counter N0[x0]
for each of 253 possible values of x0 = x
1
0‖x20‖x30‖x40, where x10 = R6,l, x20 = R6,r, x30 =
(L0,r⊕L6,r)[0−7]‖(L0,r⊕L6,r)[10−15], x40 = (L0,l⊕L6,l⊕R6,r)[0−6]⊕(L0,l⊕L6,l⊕R6,r)[9−15]
and set them zero. Calculate the number of pairs of plaintext-ciphertext with given values
x0 and save it in N0[x0]. In this step, around 2
64 plaintext-ciphertext pairs are divided into
253 different states. So the assumption N0 as a 16-bit counter is sufficient.
2. Guess the 14-bit KL6,2[0 − 7],KL6,2[10 − 15]. Allocate a counter N1[x1] for each of
239 possible values of x1 = x
1
1‖x21‖x31, where x11 = x10, x21 = x20 and set them zero. For
214 possible values of x30, compute x
3
1 = x
4
0 ⊕
(
(¬(KL6,2[0 − 7]‖KL6,2[10 − 15])  x30) ≪
1
)
[0−6]⊕((¬(KL6,2[0−7]‖KL6,2[10−15])x30)≪ 1)[9−15] and update the value N1[x1] =
N1[x1] +N0[x0].
3. Guess the 23-bit KO6,1 and KI6,1[0 − 6]. Allocate a counter N2[x2] for each of 223
possible values of x2 = x
1
2‖x22, where x12 = x21 and set them zero. For all 216 possible values
of x11, compute x
2
2 = x
3
1 ⊕ FI6,1(x11 ⊕KO6,1,KI6,1)[0− 6]⊕ FI6,1(x11 ⊕KO6,1,KI6,1)[9− 15]
and update the value N2[x2] = N2[x2] +N1[x1].
4. Guess the 23-bit KO6,2 and KI6,2[0 − 6]. Allocate a counter N3[x3] for each of 27
possible values of x3 and set them zero. For all 2
16 possible values of x12, compute x
1
3 =
x22⊕FI6,2(x12⊕KO6,2,KI6,2)[0− 6]⊕FI6,2(x12⊕KO6,2,KI6,2)[9− 15] and update the value
N3[x3] = N3[x3] +N2[x2].
5. Allocate a 64-bit counter vector V [z] for 7-bit z, where z is the concatenation of
evaluations of 7 basis zero-correlation masks. Compute z from x3 with 7 basis zero-correlation
masks, save it in N [z], that is N [z]+ = N3[x3]. Compute the statistic T according to Equation
(1). If T < τ , the guessed key value is a right key candidate.
6. As there are 68 master key bits that we have not guessed, we do exhaustive search for
all keys conforming to this possible key candidate.
In this attack, we set the type-I error probability β0 = 2
−2.7 and the type-II error proba-
bility β1 = 2
−45. We have z1−β0 ≈ 1, z1−β1 ≈ 3.3, n = 64, l = 27. The date complex N is
about 262.8 and the decision threshold τ ≈ 26.22.
During the encryption and decryption phase, there are about 260 × 2−45 = 215 key can-
didates survive in the wrong key filtration. The complexity of Step 2,3,4 is no more than
214+53 = 267 memory access, 214+23+39 = 276 memory access and 214+23+23+23 = 83 memory
access, respectively. If we consider one memory accesses as a 6-round encryption, the total
time complexity of step 3,4,5 is about 283 of 6-round KASUMI. The complexity of Step 6 is
about 285 6-round KASUMI encryptions which is also the dominant part of our attack. In
total, the data complexity is about 262.1 known plaintexts, the time complexity is about 285
of 6-round encryptions and the memory requirements are 254 bytes for counters.
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Figure 4: Multidimensional Zero-correlation attack on KASUMI reduced to rounds 2-8
5 Key-Recovery Attack on 7-Round KASUMI(2-8)
In this section, we extend our attacks to the last 7 round of KASUMI. We mount the 5-
round zero-correlation linear approximations from round 3 to round 7, and extend one round
forward and backward respectively. We assume that the subkeys KL2,2[0− 7] = KL8,2[0− 7]
and KL2,2[10 − 15] = KL8,2[10 − 15]. There are 2−14 of the master keys space having this
property. In the attack, based on Observation 5, we also select some special input/output
masks to reduce number of guessed key bits. In our attack, we guess the subkeys and evaluate
the linear approximation (β, β′)T · ((L2,l, L2,r) ⊕(R7,l, R7,r)) = 0, that is
(β, β′) · ((R1,l ⊕ L8,l ⊕ L1,r ⊕R8,r), (R1,r ⊕ L8,r))⊕ β · (FI(L1,l ⊕ (k3 ≪ 5), k′6)⊕ FI(L1,r
⊕k′5, k7 ≪ 8)⊕ FI(R8,l ⊕ (k1 ≪ 5), k′4)⊕ FI(R8,r ⊕ (k5 ≪ 8), k′3)
)
= 0,
where β′ = β ≫ 1qKL8,2 and β is 16-bit non-zero value with β[0 − 6] = β[9 − 15] and
β[7] = β[8] = 0. Then the key-recovery attack on the last 7-round KASUMI is proceeded
with Partial-sum technique as follows:
1. Collect N plaintexts with corresponding ciphertexs. Allocate a 8-bit counter V0[y0]
for each of 285 possible values of y0 = y
1
0‖y20‖y30‖y40‖y50‖y60 where y10 = L1,l, y20 = L1,r,
y30 = R8,l, y
4
0 = R8,r, y
5
0 = (R1,l⊕L8,l⊕R8,r⊕L1,r)[0− 6]⊕ (R1,l⊕L8,l⊕R8,r⊕L1,r)[9− 15],
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y60 = (L8,r ⊕ R1,l)[0 − 7]‖(R1,l ⊕ L8,l)[10 − 15], and set them zero. Calculate the number of
pairs of plaintext-ciphertext with given values y0 and save it in V0[y0]. In this step, around
264 plaintext-ciphertext pairs are divided into 285 different states. So the assumption V0 as a
8-bit counter is sufficient.
2. Guess the 46-bit KO2,1, KO8,1, KI2,1[0 − 6] and KI8,1[0 − 6]. Allocate a counter
V1[y1] for each of 2
53 possible values of y1 = y
1
1‖y21‖y31‖y41 where y11 = y20, y21 = y40, y31 = y60,
and set them zero. For all 232 possible values of y10 and y
3
0, compute y
4
1 = y
5
0 ⊕ FI2,1(y10 ⊕
KO2,1,KI2,1)[0−6]⊕FI8,1(y30⊕KO8,1,KI8,1)[9−15] and update the value V1[y1] = V1[y1]+
V0[y0].
3. Guess the 7-bit KL2,2[7],KL2,2[10−15] and then deduce KL2,2[0−6] from KI8,1[0−6].
Allocate a counter V2[y2] for each of 2
39 possible values of y2 = y
1
2‖y22‖y32 where y12 = y11,
y22 = y
2
1 and set them zero. For all 2
14 possible values of y31, compute y
3
2 = y
4
1⊕
((¬(KL2,2[0−
7]‖KL2,2[10− 15])  y31
)
≪ 1
)
[0− 6]⊕
((¬(KL2,2[0− 7]‖KL2,2[10− 15])  y31)≪ 1)[9− 15]
and update the value V2[y2] = V2[y2] + V1[y1].
4. Guess the 16-bit KO8,2 and deduce KI8,2 from KO2,1. Allocate a counter V3[y3] for
each of 223 possible values of y3 = y
1
3‖y23 where y23 = y12 and set them zero. For all 216 possible
values of y22, compute y
1
3 = y
3
2⊕FI8,2(y22⊕KO8,2,KI8,2)[0−6]⊕FI8,2(y22⊕KO8,2,KI8,2)[9−15]
and update the value V3[y3] = V3[y3] + V2[y2].
5. Guess the 16-bit KO2,2 and deduce KI2,2 from KO8,2. Allocate a counter V4[y4] for
each of 27 possible values of y4 and set them zero. For all 2
16 possible values of y23, compute
y3 = y
1
3 ⊕ FI2,2(y23 ⊕KO2,2,KI2,2)[0− 6]⊕ FI2,2(y23 ⊕KO2,2,KI2,2)[9− 15] and update the
value V4[y4] = V4[y4] + V3[y3].
6. Allocate 64-bit counters V [z] for 7-bit z and initialize them to zero, where z is the
concatenation of evaluations of 7 basis zero-correlation masks. Compute z from y4 with 7
basis zero-correlation masks, save it in V [z], that is V [z]+ = V4[y4]. Compute the statistic T
according to Equation (1). If T < τ , then the guessed key value is a right key candidate.
7. As there are 29 master key bits that we have not guessed, we do exhaustive search for
all keys conforming to this possible key candidate.
In this attack, we set the type-I error probability β0 = 2
−2.7 and the type-II error prob-
ability β1 = 2
−5. We have z1−β0 ≈ 1, z1−β1 ≈ 2.4, n = 64, l = 27. The date complex N is
about 262.6 and the decision threshold τ ≈ 26.47.
There are 285 master key value guessed during the encryption and decryption phase, and
285 · 2−5 = 280 key candidates can survive in the wrong key filtration. The complexity of the
Step 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 is about 262.6×246 = 2108.6, 246×27×253 = 2106, 246×27×216×239 = 2108
and 246× 27× 216× 216× 223 = 2108 and 280× 229 = 2109 7-round KASUMI encryptions. the
compute complexity is about 2110.5 7-round KASUMI encryptions with 262.1 known plaintexts
and 285 memory bytes for counters.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the security of KASUMI with respect to the novel technique of the
multidimensional zero-correlation cryptanalysis. We investigate the properties of the linear
masks propagate in components (AND, OR functions)and then show some observations on
the FL,FO and FI function. By selecting some special input/output masks, we refine the
zero-correlation linear approximations and give first multidimensional zero-correlation attack
on the 6-round KASUMI. Moreover, under the weak keys conditions that the second keys
of the FL function in round 2 and round 8 have the same value at 1st to 8th and 11th to
16th bit-positions, the paper expanded the attack to 7 rounds(2-8). The two attacks need
285 encryptions with 262.8 chosen plaintexts, 254 memory bytes and 2110.5 encryptions with
262.1 known plaintexts, 285 memory bytes, respectively.
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